From: nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye)
Subject: Re: After 2000 years, can we say that Christian Morality is
Organization: University of Wisconsin Eau Claire
Lines: 62

[reply to frank@D012S658.uucp (Frank O'Dwyer)]
 
>>The problem for the objectivist is to determine the status of moral
>>truths and the method by which they can be established.  If we accept
>>that such judgements are not reports of what is but only relate to
>>what ought to be (see naturalistic fallacy) then they cannot be proved
>>by any facts about the nature of the world.
 
>This can be avoided in at least two ways: (1) By leaving the Good
>undefined, since anyone who claims that they do not know what it is is
>either lying or so out of touch with humanity as to be undeserving of a
>reply.
 
If the Good is undefined (undefinable?) but you require of everyone that
they know innately what is right, you are back to subjectivism.
 
>(2) By defining the Good solely in terms of evaluative terms.
 
Ditto here.  An evaluative statement implies a value judgement on the
part of the person making it.
 
>>At this point the objectivist may talk of 'self-evident truths'
 
Pretty perceptive, that Prof. Flew.
 
>>but can he deny the subjectivist's claim that self-evidence is in the
>>mind of the beholder?
 
>Of course; by denying that subject/object is true dichotomy.
 
Please explain how this helps.  I don't see your argument.
 
>>If not, what is left of the claim that some moral judgements are true?
 
>If nothing, then NO moral judgements are true.  This is a thing that
>is commonly referred to as nihilism.  It entails that science is of
>no value, irrepective of the fact that some people find it useful.  How
>anyone arrives at relativism/subjectivism from this argument beats me.
 
This makes no sense either.  Flew is arguing that this is where the
objectivist winds up, not the subjectivist.  Furthermore, the nihilists
believed in nothing *except* science, materialism, revolution, and the
People.
 
>>The subjectivist may well feel that all that remains is that there are
>>some moral judgements with which he would wish to associate himself.
>>To hold a moral opinion is, he suggests, not to know something to be
>>true but to have preferences regarding human activity."
 
>And if those preferences should include terrorism, that moral opinion
>is not true.  Likewise, if the preferences should include noTerrorism,
>that moral opinion is not true.  Why should one choose a set of
>preferences which include terrorisim over one which includes
>noTerrorism?  Oh, no reason.  This is patently absurd....
 
And also not the position of the subjectivist, as has been pointed out
to you already by others.  Ditch the strawman, already, and see my reply
to Mike Cobb's root message in the thread Societal Basis for Morality.
 
David Nye (nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu).  Midelfort Clinic, Eau Claire WI
This is patently absurd; but whoever wishes to become a philosopher
must learn not to be frightened by absurdities. -- Bertrand Russell